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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Appeal No. 20050707-CA
VERNON RENTZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-18a-l(l)(a) (2003) and UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE 3(a) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal from the Probation
Revocation and Commitment to Utah State Prison filed on July 19,2005, in this case involving a
second degree felony and a third degree felony conviction from a court of record.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVDEW
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress pertaining to his
probation revocation?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The Court ofAppeals reviews factualfindingsunderlying
the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard,
and reviews the legal conclusions for correctness." Statev.Jarman. 1999 UT App 269, |4,987 P.2d
1284.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AIVIEND. IV
B.

UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I §12

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 13, 2003, Vernon Rentz ("Rentz") was charged with Aggravated Robbery, a
second degree felony, and two counts of Aggravated Assault, both third degree felonies. R0001R0002. On March 3,2003, Rentz entered his Statement ofDefendant in Support ofGuilty Plea and
Certificate of Counsel, pleading guilty to Aggravated Robbery and one count ofAggravated Assault.
R0018-R0025. On April 16, 2005, a Judgment and Order of Probation was entered, sentencing
Rentz to serve 1-15 years on the first charge and 0-5 years on the second charge. R0027-R0029.
The sentences were both stayed and Rentz was ordered to serve 3 months in the San Juan County
Jail and placed on probation for 36 months. Id On April 6,2003, Rentz was committed to the San
Juan County Jail. R0030-R0032. On April 7,2003, Rentz entered into a probation agreement with
Adult Probation and Parole. R0053.
On October 20,2003, the State of Utah (the "State'5)filedan Order to Show Cause alleging
that Rentz had violated his probation agreement in that he had failed to complete outpatient
treatment, failed to seek or maintain full-time employment, failed to report, and used a controlled
substance (marijuana). R0033-R0037. On November 26,2005, Honorable Judge Lyle Anderson
of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan County, entered the court's Order
Continuing Probation, revoking Rentz's probation and reinstating it for 36 months based on Rentz
submitting himself to serve another 30 days in the San Juan County Jail. R0042-R0044. On
December 17,2003, Rentz was committed to the San Juan County Jail. R0045-R0046.
2

On May 12, 2005, the State filed its Order to Show Cause (the "OSC") and affidavit in
support alleging that Rente had violated the terms of his probation agreement in that he had owned,
possessed or had under his control an explosive, firearm or dangerous weapon without written
authorization. R0049-R0052. On May 13,2005, an arrest warrant was issued on the OSC, then later
recalled on May 20,2005, since Rente had been booked into the jail. R0057-R0058.
On July 12, 2005, Rente filed his Motion to Suppress (the "Motion") respecting the
allegations contained in the OSC. R0068-R0069. On July 18,2005, the matter came for hearing on
the Motion and the OSC. R0079. Judge Anderson concluded that the exclusionary rule did not
apply to probation revocation hearings and entered the trial court's Probation Revocation and
Commitment to Utah State Prison (the "Revocation"). R0070-R0071. On August 17,2005, Rente
filed his Notice of Appeal from the Revocation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 23,2005, the local dispatch received a call from Dorothy Phillips ("Phillips") that
Rente was harassing her and she was afraid because Rente was the owner of a gun, although he had
not used or shown that he was in possession of any gun or weapon during the alleged harassment.
Tr. at pp.10, 19, 20, 23. Officer Lambert Teschini ("Teschini") was dispatched and arrived
regarding Phillips report.

Teschini testified that, when he arrived on scene, Rente was an

unauthorized occupant of a house approximately one hundred yards from Phillips' residence, and
would not come out. Id. at pp. 10,12. Teschini borrowed a knife from Phillips to pry the door open
where Rente was located. Id. at p. 26. Upon opening the door, Teschini found Rente to be sober,
cooperative, and unarmed. Id. at p. 10.
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Phillips told Teschini that Rente's girlfriend, who was staying at the woman's shelter in
Blanding, Utah, had told Philips that there was a gun inside Rente's vehicle in the cup holder in the
center console. Upon receiving information from Phillips that Rente had a gun in his vehicle, the
police sergeant who arrived on scene asked Rente if they could search his vehicle, to which Rente
consented. Tr. at p. 11,24. Rente was not under arrest at any point during the search. Id. at p. 24.
Teschini thoroughly searched Rente's vehicle, including in the cup holder, under the hood, the tire,
the tire well, etc., and did not locate a gun. Tr. at p. 11. Since the consensual search did not yield
any results, the sergeant told Rente to leave the area. Id at pp. 12, 25-26. Teschini testified that
Rente left, "...taking his time." Id at p. 12.
Teschini then went to return the knife to Phillips and told her there was no gun in the cup
holder. Tr. at p. 12. Phillips then told him that Rente's girlfriend had told her that Rente's cup
holder could be removed and that there was a compartment underneath it. Id Officer Teschini did
not personally speak with Rente's girlfriend respecting this information. Id. at p. 26. Teschini got
in his patrol car, activated his light bar, followed in the direction Rente had gone. Id at p. 12.
Rente had been gonefromthe residence only for a minute and had not committed any traffic
violation. Tr. at p. 27. Teschini effectuated a stop of Rente's vehicle, told Rente that he needed to
check one more area in the vehicle, and told Rente to step out of the vehicle and stand infrontof it.
Tr. at pp. 12, 27. Rente did not say anything, stepped out of the vehicle and stood in front of the
vehicle, while Teschini conducted a further search. Tr.atpp. 12,15. Teschinijiggled the cup holder
inside the vehicle and it popped open. Tr. p. 14. Teschini lifted out the cup holder and did not see
a gun but, upon further investigation, he saw the magazine well of a gun and removed a gun from
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that location. Tr. at p. 16. Teschini then turned the gun over to Mr. Lyman of the Federal Bureau
of Investigations for safekeeping. Tr. at pp. 16,28.
Teschini testified that he was not executing a probation search when he effectuated the stop
and search of Rentz's vehicle. Id. at p. 17. Teschini additionally testified that he did not believe
Rentz had violated any law by possessing the firearm. Id at p. 28. Since Teschini had never met
Rentz and did not know he was on probation, Rentz was allowed to proceed on his way without the
firearm and without arrest. Tr. at p. 11.
On May 12,2005, after it was determined that Rentz was on probation during this incident,
the Statefiledthe OSC against Rentz, alleging that he had violated his probation agreement, in that
he had owned, possessed, or had under his control afirearm.R0049-R0052. On July 8,2005, Rentz
filed the Motion pursuant to UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I § 12 and UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,
AMEND.

IV. R0068-0069. On July 18, 2005, the Motion and OSC came for hearing before

Honorable Judge Lyle R. Anderson ofthe Seventh Judicial District Court. The trial court determined
that suppression motions were inappropriate in probation revocation proceedings, denied the motion,
and entered the Revocation. R0070-R0071. On August 17,2005, Rentz timelyfiledhis Notice of
Appealfromthe Revocation. R0076-R0077.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The United States Supreme Court has long held that "[t]he Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule is a creature ofjudicial decisional policy. Broadly stated, its purpose is to deter illegal police
conduct by denying the state the benefit of improperly obtained evidence." Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S.
643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado. 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93
LJEd.2d 1782 (1949); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).
5

State v. Dodd 419 So .2d 333 Fla.,1982.. The determination as to whether the Fourth Amendment
should apply to probation and parole revocation proceedings has been analyzed by nearly every
jurisdiction in the United States, but none ofthese jurisdictions has specifically touched on the issues
contained herein.
In Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott 524 U.S.357.118 S. Ct 2014,141
L.Ed.2d 344, (U.S. Pa.1998), a bare majority decision, the United States Supreme Court undertook
an analysis of the application of the exclusionary rule and the Fourth Amendment to parole
revocation hearings. In Scott the court stated that a Fourth Amendment ". . .violation is 'fully
accomplished' by the illegal search or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or
administrative proceeding can 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already
suffered."5 Id citing United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3411-3412, 82
L.Ed.2d 677 (auotinz Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465, 486, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048-3049, 49 L.Ed.2d
1067). In Scott, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to parole
revocation proceedings and that the federal exclusionary rule does not bar evidence from being
admitted that was obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment rights. Id
The Utah Court of Appeals has applied the holdings in Scott to probation revocation
proceedings in Utah. State v. Jarman. 1999 UT App 269, 987 P.2d 1284. The Utah Court of
Appeals bridged the difference in the parole proceedings of Scott versus the probation proceedings
in Jarman by stating that "...courts generally recognize the similarity between probation and parole
proceedings and have treated them uniformly." Id at f 7. However, neither Jarman nor Scott
discussed any exceptions to the application ofthe exclusionary rule to probation or parole revocation
proceedings.
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The Second District Court of Appeals has long held that "[p]arolees are, of course, not
without constitutional rights...and there is always the possibility of police harassment...[which
instances] can be treated as they arise." U. S. ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick. 426 F.2d 1161 (2nd
Circuit, N.Y. 1970)(citations omitted). The Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have
recognized that, if a case involves police harassment, an exclusion rule should be invoked to prevent
recurrence. See, U.S. v. Farmer. 512 F.2d 160,162 (6th Cir. (Ky.) 1975); U.S. v. Brown, 488 F.2d
94 (5th Cir. (Fla.) 1973). Our sister state, Colorado has similarly conceded that probationers are
entitled to certain procedural due process rights at revocation hearings, People v. Atencio, 525 P.2d
461 (Colo 1974), and its courts have cautioned that they would not condone "gross official
misconduct by law enforcement officers" to the extent that "where the unreasonable search...was
such as to shock the conscience of the court, the court would not permit such conduct to be the basis
of state-imposed sanction" in a revocation proceeding. People v. Wilkerson. 541 P.2d 896 (Colo.
1975).
In the instant matter, Teschini clearly testified he was not conducting the search under
suspicion of illegality or probationary status, and any safety issues were dispelled by thefirstsearch
and the release of Rentz from their detention. An exception to the Scott and Jarman rules is
necessary as it pertains to factual scenarios as found in the instant matter in order to protect the
Fourth Amendmentrightsof everyday citizensfrombeing stopped and searched upon no suspicion
of illegality, probationary status or safetyriskto others. Officers should not be allowed to undertake
the actions that violated Rente's Fourth Amendmentrightsin this matter and such conduct should
not be tolerated as the basis for any type of state-imposed sanction.

7

ARGUMENT
APPELLANT'S MOHON TO SUPPRESS
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENTERTAINED AND GRANTED
A.

The Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Probation Revocation Proceedings
and its Exceptions.

The United States Supreme Court has long held that "[t]he Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule is a creature of judicial decisional policy. Broadly stated, its purpose is to deter illegal police
conduct by denying the state the benefit of improperly obtained evidence." Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S.
643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado. 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93
L.Ed.2d 1782 (1949); Weeks v. United States. 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).
State v. Dodd 419 So.2d 333 Fla.,1982. The determination as to whether the Fourth Amendment
should apply to probation and parole revocation proceedings has been analyzed by nearly every
jurisdiction in the United States, but none of these jurisdictions has specifically touched on the issues
contained herein. Rentz does not attempt to overturn the standing precedence, as set forth below,
as to the Fourth Amendment's application to probation revocation proceedings, but will show that
further analysis should be undertaken at the trial court to safeguard the rights of the probationer.
Further, Rentz argues that a blanket determination should not be the eventual course in each and
every case, but that a totality of the circumstances analysis should be the determining factor as to the
whether the Fourth Amendment applies to each particular probation case.
(1)

In Scott, the United States Supreme Court Has Declined to Apply the Exclusionary
Rule or Fourth Amendment Rights to Parole Revocation Hearings.
(a)

The Majority in Scott Held the Exclusionary Rule to Be Prudential
Rather than Constitutionally Mandated and Thus Not Applicable to
Parole Revocation Proceedings.

8

In Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524U.S.357,118 S. Ct. 2014,141
L.Ed.2d 344, (U.S. Pa. 1998), a bare majority decision, the United States Supreme Court undertook
an analysis of the application of the exclusionary rule and the Fourth Amendment to parole
revocation hearings. In Scott the court stated that a Fourth Amendment ". . .violation is 'fully
accomplished' by the illegal search or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or
administrative proceeding can 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already
suffered.'" Id. citing United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3411-3412, 82
L.Ed.2d 677 (quoting Stone v. Powell. 428 U.S. 465,486, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048-3049, 49 L.Ed.2d
1067). Rather than being curative, the exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of
deterring illegal searches and seizures. Id. citing United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338,348, 94
S.Ct. 613, 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). As such, the rule does not "proscribe the introduction of
illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons," Id. c/rmgPoweli 428 U.S. at 486,
96 S.Ct. at 3048-3049, but applies only in contexts "where its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously served." Id. citing Calandra. 414 U.S. at 348,94 S.Ct at 620; see also, United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,454,96 S.Ct 3021, 3032,49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) ("If... the exclusionary
rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is
unwarranted").
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Scott was only decided by a bare majority, with a 5-4
margin. Id. 524 U.S.357, 118 S. Ct. 2014. In Scott, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation proceedings and that the federal exclusionary
rule does not bar evidencefrombeing admitted that was obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment
rights. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court indicated that a state's use of the illegally obtained evidence
9

does not violate the Constitution since & parole1 revocation hearing is administrative rather than
criminal in nature. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to allow the exclusionary rule
to apply to parole revocation hearings, maintaining that allowing the exclusionary rule to apply
would cause an administrative proceeding to involve "extensive litigation" to determine what
evidence would be admissible. Id The United States Supreme Court majority in Scott held that,
because the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, it is applicable only where its
deterrence benefits outweigh its "substantial social costs." Scott at 363, citing Leon. 468 U.S. at
906,104 S.Ct. at 3411-3412.
(b)

The Minority in Scott Dissented on the Basis That the Exclusionary Rule Is
Constitutionally Mandated and Should Apply to Parole Revocation
Proceedings as a Deterrence.

The four United States Supreme Court justices who comprised the minority in Scott chose
to write an extensive dissenting opinion on the matter. Justice Souter, the writer of the dissenters'
opinion in Scott, stated that the majority's opinion".. .rests upon mistaken conceptions ofthe actual
function of revocation." Scott at 524 U.S. at 370, 118 S. Ct. at 2023, Justice Souter, with whom
Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsberg and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. Justice Souter explained as
follows:
In reality a revocation proceeding often serves the same function as a criminal trial,
and the revocation hearing may very well present the only forum in which the State
will seek to use evidence of a parole violation, even when that evidence would
support an independent criminal charge. The deterrent function of the exclusionary

1

Research indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court has never specifically made this
determination as to probation revocation proceedings; however, the Utah Court of Appeals has
determined that probation and parole revocation proceedings are the same and that Scott thus
applies to probation revocation, as well as parole revocation proceedings. See, State v. Jarman.
1999 UT App 269, 987 P.2d 1284, below.
10

rule is therefore implicated as much by a revocation proceeding as by a conventional
trial, and the exclusionary rule should be applied accordingly.
Id "[T]he actual likelihood of trial is often far less than the probability of a petition for parole
revocation, with the consequence that the revocation hearing will be the only forum in which the
evidence will ever be offered." Id, 524 U.S. at 374,118 S. Ct. at 2025. He further explained as
follows:
I think [the majority] has misunderstood the significance of admitting illegally seized
evidence at the revocation hearing. On the one hand, the majority magnifies the cost
of an exclusionary rule for parole cases by overemphasizing the differences between
a revocation hearing and a trial, and on the other hand it has minimized the benefits
by failing to recognize the significant likelihood that the revocation hearing will be
the principal, not the secondary, forum, in which evidence of a parolee's criminal
conduct will be offered.

What is at least equally telling is that parole revocation willfrequentlybe pursued
instead of prosecution as the course of choice, a fact recognized a quarter of a century
ago when we observed in Morrissey v. Brewer that a parole revocation proceeding
"is often preferred to a new prosecution because of the procedural ease of
recommitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State." 408 U.S.,
at 479, 92 S.Ct, at 2599; see also Cohen & Gobert, § 8.06, at 386 ("Favoring the
[exclusionary] rule's applicability is the fact that the revocation proceeding, often
based on the items discovered in the search, is used in lieu of a criminal trial").
The reasons for this tendency to skip any new prosecution are obvious. If the conduct
in question is a crime in its own right, the odds of revocation are very high. Since
time on the street before revocation is not subtractedfromthe balance of the sentence
to be served on revocation, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S., at 480,92 S.Ct., at 25992600, the balance may well be long enough to render recommitment the practical
equivalent of a new sentence for a separate crime. And all of this may be
accomplished without shouldering the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt;
hence the obvious popularity of revocation in place of new prosecution.
The upshot is that without a suppression remedy in revocation proceedings, there will
often be no influence capable of deterring Fourth Amendment violations when parole
revocation is a possible response to new crime. Suppression in the revocation
proceeding cannot be looked upon, then, as furnishing merely incremental or
marginal deterrence over and above the effect of exclusion in criminal prosecution.
Instead, it will commonly provide the only deterrence to unconstitutional conduct
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when the incarceration of parolees is sought, and the reasons that support the
suppression remedy in prosecution therefore support it in parole revocation.
Id, 524 U.S. at 377,379,118 S. Ct. at 2026-2027. Justice Stevens aptly summarized the dissenters'
opinion by offering one additional comment as a mere endorsement:
.. .the "rule is constitutionally required, not as a "right9 explicitly incorporated in the
fourth amendment's prohibitions, but as a remedy necessary to ensure that those
prohibitions are observed in fact." Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond:
The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-andSeizure Cases, 83 Colum. L.Rev. 1365,1389 (1983). See also Arizona v. Evans, 514
U.S. 1,18-19, and n. 1,115S.Ct 1185,1195-1196, and n. 1,131 L.Ed.2d34(1995)
(STEVENS, J., dissenting); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 828, and n. 22,
104 S.Ct 3380,3398, and n. 22,82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting);
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,978, and n. 37,104 S.Ct. 3430,3455, and n. 37,
82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
Id, 524 U.S. at 369-370,118 S.Ct at 2023. Based on their determination that the exclusionary rule
was constitutionally mandated and should apply to parole revocation hearings, the dissenters'
opinion was that the search in Scott violated the Fourth Amendment. Scott at 524 U.S. at 380,118
S.Ct. at 2028.
(2)

The Utah Court of Appeals Has Extended Scott to Probation Revocation
Proceedings in Utah.

The Utah Court of Appeals has applied the holdings in Scott to probation revocation
proceedings in Utah. State v. Jarman. 1999 UT App 269, 987 P.2d 1284. Like the Pennsylvania
parole proceeding at issue in Scott the Utah appellate courts have previously determined that
probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature. Jarman at f 7, citing State v. Hudecek, 965
P.2d 1069,1071 (UtahCt.App.1998). The Utah Court ofAppeals bridged the difference in the parole
proceedings of Scott versus the probation proceedings in Jarman by stating that "...courts generally
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recognize the similarity between probation and parole proceedings and have treated them uniformly. *
Id at If 7 2 .
In Jarman, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that".. .consistent with Scott, the Utah
Supreme Court recently held that the exclusionary rule does not apply where the social costs
outweigh the benefit of deterrence." Jarman at f7, citing In re A.R.. 982 P.2d 73, (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to child protection proceedings). Jarman additionally recognized
that ". . .the [United States Supreme] Court concluded that the marginal deterrence gained from
applying the exclusionary rule in the narrow area ofparole revocations did not justify the particularly
high costs of excluding reliable, probative evidence. Id. at % 6. The decision in Jarman held that
"...because the acts constituting a probation violation could also give rise to a criminal prosecution,
the exclusionary rule*s application to criminal prosecutions already deters unreasonable searches and
seizures of probationers." Id citing Scott. 118 S.Ct. at 2022.
Consequently, the Utah Court ofAppeals concluded in Jarman that they were bound by Scott,
holding that the exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment does not apply in the context of
probation revocation proceedings. Jarman at |7. However, neither Jarman nor Scott discussed any
exceptions to the application ofthe exclusionary rule to probation or parole revocation proceedings.

2

Jarman at f 7; see, e.g, Gaenon v. Scarpelli. 411 U.S. 778, 782 & n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 1756,
1759-60 & n. 3,36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973)( "Petitioner does not contend that there is any difference
relevant to the guarantee of due process between the revocation of parole and the revocation of
probation, nor do we perceive one."); State v. Bvingtoa 936 P.2d 1112,1116 n. 2,1117 (Utah
Ct.App.l997)(noting that parole and probation proceedings are distinct but "discusspng]
precedent relevant to both, interchangeably" and applying due process analysisfromparole
proceedings to probation revocation proceedings); State v. Martinez. 811 P.2d 205,209-10 (Utah
Ct.App.1991) (applying requirementfromthe parole context—that a dwelling search must be
predicated on a reasonable suspicion—to the search of a probationer).
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B.

Rentz Would Have Prevailed on His Suppression Motion, Had it Been
Entertained by the Trial Court
(1)

The Initial Stop of Rentz's Vehicle was Not Justified at its Inception.

The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that police searches are reviewed
under a two-prong test: first, the officer's action must be justified at its inception, and second, the
search must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the initial interference.
Terry v.Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,19-20, 88 S.Ct 1868,20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Under the first prong, the
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, lead the officer to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon
will be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Tetmver. 947 P.2d 1157,1159 (Utah App. 1997) citing
State v.Pena. 869 P.2d 932,940 (Utah 1994). The Utah Court of Appeals in Tetmver analyzed the
first prong as follows:

This court determines whether sufficient specific and articulable facts exist to
establish reasonable suspicion by examining the totality of the facts and
circumstances ofthe case. See Case, 884 P.2d at 1276; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at21,
88 S.Ct. at 1880 ("And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion/'); State v. Potter* 863
P.2d 40, 43 (Utah.Ct.App.1993) ("There is no bright line test for determining if
reasonable suspicion exists. Rather, courts must look at the totality of the
circumstances." (citation omitted)). "[W]hether a specific set of facts gives rise to
reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for
correctness ... [with] a measure of discretion [afforded] to the trial judge when
applying that standard to a given set of facts." Pena. 869 P.2d at 939. Id
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Id at 1159. The Utah Court ofAppeals more recently undertook an analysis of the issue surrounding
the stopping of an automobile by an officer under the Fourth Amendment, as follows:
"Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a 'seizure' within
the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendmentf], even though the purpose of the stop is
limited and the resulting detention quite brief."State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125,f28,
63 P.3d 650 (alterations in original) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648,653
(1979)); see also United States v. Tibbetts. 396 F.3d 1132,1136 (10th Cir. 2005) ("A
traffic stop is a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 'even though
the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief."' (citation
omitted)). Therefore, such an action is justified only "if there is a reasonable
suspicion that the [occupant ofthe vehicle] is involved in criminal activity," and "the
State bears the initial burden for establishing the articulable factual basis for the
reasonable suspicion necessary to support an investigatory stop." State v. Case, 884
P.2d 1274,1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In general, "[t]he specific and articulable facts required to support reasonable
suspicion are . . . based on an investigating officer's own observations and
inferences." Id at 1276-77. "Reasonable suspicion is 'a particularized and objective
basis' for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity," Tibbetts* 396 F.3d at
1138, and whether or not a detention is supported by reasonable suspicion is
determined by examining the totality of the circumstances, not through an
examination of each individual fact. See State v. Brake. 2004 UT 95,f38,103 P.3d
699 (concluding that the totality of the circumstances did not support a police
officer's warrantless search of the interior of an automobile for weapons).
State v. Vfl^ift. 2005 UT App 261, flf 6-7,116 P.3d 969. The Utah Court of Appeals determined
in Yazzie that "...the State has presented us with no circumstances that existed at the time of [the
officer's] decision to stop Yazzie that suggest Yazzie was involved in any illegal activity, let alone
circumstances sufficient to justify the detention." Id. at f 10. The officer's intention in Yazzie was
not justified at its inception. Id. at % 12.
In the instant matter, Officer Teschini testified that he searched Rentz's car at Phillips'
residence, and released Rentz. Teschini then testified that he received further information from
Phillips, however, this information did not cause him to believe that Rentz was engaged in any
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illegal activity. Tr. at pp. 17,27,28. Teschini also testified, however, that Phillips had informed
him that Rentz was on probation and was not supposed to be in possession of a gun. Id. at p. 17.
Rather than checking Rentz's probation status3 to determine whether Phillips' hearsay information
was correct, Teschini chose to effectuate a stop and subsequent search of Rentz's vehicle.
Officer Teschini's decision to stop Rentz failed to rise to either a reasonable or articulable
suspicion, and there were no circumstances existing at the time of the stop to suggest that Rentz was
involved in any criminal activity. See, Yazzie at % 10. "[SJpecific and articulable facts required to
support reasonable suspicion are . . . based on an investigating officer's own observations and
inferences/' Yazzie at f 7, citing Case at 1276-1277. Teschini testified that his "own observations
and inferences" were such that he did not believe Rentz was involved in any criminal activity even
if he found a gun in Rentz's vehicle. Teschini still chose to effectuate a stop and search of Rentz's
vehicle, however, in violation of Rentz's Fourth Amendment rights.

(2)

The Second Search of Rentz's Vehicle was Unreasonable.

The Utah Court of Appeals has recently undertaken an analysis of Terry specifically as it
pertains to searches conducted for purposes of finding and neutralizing suspected weapons. See,
State v. Naiarno. 2005 UT App 311,118 P.3d 285. Naiarno recognized as follows:
When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the
officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the
power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying

3

No testimony was offered, and it is unclear whether Teschini himself knew as to
whether the information he received on Rentz's probation status from Phillips—who received the
information from Rentz's ex-girlfriend over the phone-was current or completed.
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a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. [Terry] at 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868
(emphasis added).
However, the Court cautioned that the "necessary measures" authorized in Terry
"constitute[ ] a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security," and
that as such they must "be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify
[their] initiation." Id, at 24-26,88 S.Ct. 1868. Moreover, the Court further stated that
the only reason such a search is permitted is to find and neutralize suspected
weapons, and that the search undertaken to complete this narrow task "must therefore
be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives,
clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." Id. at 29,88
S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added). Consequently, although Terry does not define the
physical scope of a permissible search in the absence of probable cause, it clearly
identifies when such a search may be made, as well as clearly stating that the search
must be narrowly tailored to do no more than blunt the exigency that permitted the
search in the first place.

In precise terms, Terry states that a police officer is permitted to "search" a person
that the officer reasonably believes (1) is involved in a crime; (2) is armed; and (3)
is presently dangerous to the officer, the public, or the person to be searched. See id,
at 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Moreover, "[a] search for weapons in the absence of probable
cause to arrest ... must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies which justify its initiation," and cannot stray into a general search for
evidence of wrongdoing." Id, at 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added).

In Terry,... the Supreme Court concluded that the search was reasonable, holding
that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonablefearfor his own or others'safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of
the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him. Id, at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added).
Id, at ff 13-16. Najamo challenged the search of his person for weapons as a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights indicating that the search went beyond the bounds of reasonability required by
Terrv. Id, at 112. The Utah Court of Appeals reviewed the search and seizure issues for correctness,
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basing their review on their examination of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at f 10. The Utah
Court of Appeals determined in Najarno that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated and
that, "...concluding otherwise would, in the words ofJustice Douglas, result in a situation where 'the
police have greater authority to make a seizure and conduct a search than a judge has to authorize
suchaction."'i#atf 12,ci/wgTenxat36,88S.Ct 1868 (Douglas, J., dissenting4). The Utah Court
of Appeals recognized that its proper role, as articulated in Terry, was "...to zealously 'guard against
police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without
the objective evidentiaryjustification which the Constitutionrequires,"'concluding that there existed
no articulated facts suggesting that the officer in Naiamo was faced with an exigency that required
his raising of Najarno's pant leg to extend his search beneath the outer clothing. Id. atfflf21-22,
citing Terry at 15, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
The United States Supreme Court has previously undertaken a similar analysis as it pertains
to the application of Terry to a search of a passenger compartment of an automobile. See, Michigan
v. Long. 463 U.S. 1032,103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). It concluded as follows:
...the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas
in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer
possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the
officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain
immediate control of weapons.

4

Although the dissent to Naiamo painstakingly argues against the majority's use of this
quote given its dissenting nature, it fails to recognize that "...like many opinions voiced in
dissent, Justice Douglas raised certain valid and important points that, when viewed in the proper
light, focus our attention on our role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The above cited
language is just one of those points, and the fact that it was articulated in dissent is of no
importance." Najarno at f 12, fii. 5.
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Id. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3481; see, Terry at 21, 88 S.Ct at 1880. "[T]he issue is whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that
of others was in danger." Id, citing Terry at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883.
In the instant matter, Officer Teschini testified that, after Rentz had left Phillips' residence,
he was not effectuating the stop and second search of Rentz's vehicle based on any suspicion of
illegal activity or because he believed Rentz was on probation. Teschini specifically testified at the
probation revocation hearing in this matter that, at the time he stopped and searched Rentz, he did
not believe Rentz was committing any illegal act by possessing a gun. Tr. at p. 28. Officer Teschini
additionally testified at the hearing that he was not executing a probation search of Rentz. Tr. at pp.
17. The only reason Teschini would have for conducting the first or second search of Rentz's
vehicle then, would be for safety purposes, as regulated by Terry.
The facts of this case clearly indicate that Teschini responded to a report by Phillips that
Rentz was harassing her and that he was the owner of a gun, but that he had not used or shown that
he was in possession of any gun or weapon during the alleged harassment. Tr. at pp. 10, 20.
Teschini testified that, when he arrived on scene, Rentz was inside a house approximately one
hundred yards from Phillips residence, and would not come out. Id at pp. 10, 12. Teschini
borrowed a knife from Phillips to pry the door open where Rentz was located. Id at p. 26. Upon
opening the door, they found Rentz to be sober, cooperative, and unarmed. Id at p. 10.
Upon receiving information from Phillips that Rentz had a gun in his vehicle, the police
sergeant who arrived on scene asked Rentz if they could search his vehicle, to which Rentz
consented. Tr. at p. 11. The consensual search did not yield any results, so the sergeant told Rentz
to leave the area. Id Teschini testified that Rentz left, "...taking his time." Id. at p. 12. Teschini
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then went to return the knife to Phillips, at which time Phillips stated to him that Rente's girlfriend
had told her that Rentz's cup holder could be removed and that it was concealing a gun. Id.
Teschini got in his patrol car, activated his light bar, followed in the direction Rentz had gone, and
effectuated a stop of Rentz's vehicle. Tr. at p. 12. Teschini told Rentz to stand in front of his
vehicle while he searched the cup holder. Id. Teschini located the gun at issue herein underneath
the cup holder.
It is clear that the police sergeant and Teschini had requested consent to search Rentz's
vehicle the first time for safety purposes. Although Rentz was sober, cooperated with police,
exhibited no heightened threat to anyone, and had not been involved in any illegal activity, the
officers had received a report that Rentz was harassing someone and that he was the owner of a gun.
It can be assumed with this information that the police sergeant and Teschini wanted to ensure that
allowing Rentz into his vehicle to leave would not pose a danger to anyone involved, so they asked
to search his vehicle. Upon dispelling their concerns respecting the safety ofthose around them, they
allowed Rentz to enter his vehicle and watched him leave the area.
Once Rentz left the premises, one of the factors of Terry was no longer present. Officer
Teschini was no longer investigating Rentz at a "close range" that would cause him to fear for his
safety or the safety of others. Naiarno at t 13, citing Terry at 24, 88 S.Ct 1868. No further
illegality or threat exhibited itself between the time Rentz left the property and was stopped by
Teschini. Any safety issues the officers may have had were dispelled upon Rentz leaving the
property. As stated supra, there was no suspicion of illegality and the officer was unaware Rentz
was on probation, so the only purpose Teschini had to effectuate the second search would have been
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the original purpose of the first search-that of safety-which was dispelled upon Rentz leaving the
premises.
Terry is very clear on this matter that, "[a] search for weapons in the absence of probable
cause to arrest... must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies whichjustify
its initiation, and cannot stray into a general search for evidence of wrongdoing." Teny 25-26, 88
S.Ct. 1868. It is clear that any safety issues that may have existed were dispelled prior to the second
search undertaken after the illegal stop of Rentz's vehicle by Teschini. No "exigencies" existed to
effectuate the stop and second search. Rente's Fourth Amendment rights were violated and this
Court should "...zealously 'guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which
trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiaryjustification which the Constitution
requires."' Naiarno at fl[ 21-22, citing Terry at 15, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
C.

An Exception to the Jarman Role Should Be Recognized in Cases Where an
Officer has No Justification for a Stop or Search.

The Second District Court of Appeals has long held that "[p]arolees are, of course, not
without constitutional rights...and there is always the possibility of police harassment...[which
instances] can be treated as they arise/' U. S. ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick. 426 F.2d 1161 (2nd
Circuit, N.Y. 1970); see, Hvser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 243 (C.A.D.C. 1963); United States v.
Hallman. 365 F.2d 289,291 (3d Or. 1966); Brown v. Kearney. 355 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1966) (per
curiam); Martin v. United States. 183 F.2d 436,439 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 340 U.S. 904,71 S.Ct.
280, 95 L.Ed. 654 (1950); Abel v. United States. 362 U.S. 217, 240, 80 S.Ct. 683,4 L.Ed.2d 668
(1960). The Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts ofAppeals have recognized that, if a case involves police
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harassment, an exclusion rule should be invoked to prevent recurrence. See, U.S. v. Farmer. 512
F.2d 160,162 (6th Cir. (Ky.) 1975); U.S. v. Brown. 488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. (Fla.) 1973).
Our sister state, Colorado has similarly conceded that probationers are entitled to certain
procedural due process rights at revocation hearings, People v. Atencio. 525 P.2d 461 (Colo 1974),
and its courts have cautioned that they would not condone "gross official misconduct by law
enforcement officers" to the extent that "where the unreasonable search...was such as to shock the
conscience of the court, the court would not permit such conduct to be the basis of state-imposed
sanction" in a revocation proceeding. People v. Wilkerson. 541 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1975). The
Virginia courts have held that evidence obtained through unlawful search is admissible in probation
revocation proceedings in the absence of bad faith by police. Anderson v. Com.. 470 S.E.2d 862
(Va. 1996). The Washington Court of Appeals has similarly determined that "only when the police
act in bad faith should evidence which is illegally seized be suppressed in a probation revocation
proceeding." State v. Procton 559 P.2d 1363,1364 (Wash. App. 1977).
Florida has stated that "...for evidence derived from a search or seizure to be admissible in
either probation revocation proceedings or a new criminal action, the evidence must be properly or
reasonably obtained given the circumstances and the responsibilities of the probation supervisor or
a law enforcement official who makes the search and seizure." Grubbs v. State, 373 So.2d 905 (Fla.
1979). In the case of State v. Proctor, our sister jurisdiction held as follows with respect to applying
the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings:
A probation revocation petition could ... be dismissed ... if under the totality of the
circumstances the trial court found that the police acted in bad faith in obtaining the evidence that
formed the basis for the petition to revoke probation. Whether the police knew or had reason to know
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that the person to be searched was on probation is an important factor to be considered in
determining if there was sufficient governmental misconduct to dismiss. However, a determination
whether there was sufficient governmental misconduct is a matter that rests within the sound
discretion of the trial judge to be determinedfromthe totality of the circumstances surrounding the
search in each case. Id, 559 P.2d 1363,1364-1365 (Wash. App. 1977).
The presiding judge, Richard Allen Griffin of the Michigan Court of Appeals undertook an
analysis of this issue and, in a concurring opinion, also stated that he believed that the determination
as to whether the exclusionary rule should apply to probation revocation hearings should hinge on
a totality of the circumstances analysis. People v. Perry. 201 Mich.App. 347,353,505 N. W.2d 909,
912 (Mich.App., 1993)(Griffin, Richard Allen concurring). Judge Griffin proposed an analysis that
"...would apply the exclusionary rule to the probation revocation proceedings only in those cases
where (1) the exclusion of the evidence would substantially further the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule, and (2) the need for deterrence outweighs the harm to the probation system." Id.
On review, Judge Griffin urged the Michigan Supreme Court to adopt the scholarly review and
analysis contained in note, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to Probation Revocation
Proceedings, 17 Mem.StU.L.R. 555 (1987), which sets forth as follows:
[T]he decision whether to apply the exclusionary rule to a probation revocation
proceeding] should only be made after carefully reviewing all the facts surrounding
the particular fourth amendment violation to determine whether exclusion will
substantially further the rule's deterrent purpose. Since the rule is not constitutionally
mandated, the courts must carefully avoid defeating its deterrent purpose by
mechanically applying the rule to every revocation proceeding.
... [T]he court's analysis must focus specifically on any deterrent benefits application
ofthe rule might provide. Various factors the courts should consider include whether
the officer knew that the victim of the fourth amendment violation was a probationer,
whether the officer was acting in good faith when conducting the illegal search, and
whether the evidence was secured for the primary purpose of using it in a revocation
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proceeding. Only after reviewing all the surrounding factors will the court be able to
properly assess whether exclusion of the evidence will further the rule's deterrent
purpose.
Id. 201 MichApp. at 358,505 N.W.2d at 914-915. Judge Griffin then suggests that one more factor
be added to this analysis, as articulated in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,94 S.Ct. 613,38
L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), that the courts remain concerned with the harm that will necessarily result
through exclusion of the incriminating evidence. Id. 201 MichApp. at 359, 505 N.W.2d at 915.
Judge Griffin summarized his position into a two-step analysis, stating as follows:
Therefore, the determination of whether to apply the exclusionary rule to a probation
revocation proceeding requires a two-step analysis. First, the courts must ascertain
whether any appreciable deterrent benefits can be achieved through exclusion. If so,
the courts must then decide if the need for deterrence outweighs the injury the
probation system will necessarily suffer if incriminating evidence is excluded from
the proceeding. Only if the answer to the latter question is yes should the
exclusionary rule be applied.
Id
The purpose behind the determination by the United States Supreme Court in Scott and the
Utah Court of Appeals in Jarman to not allow the exclusionary rule to apply to probation and parole
revocation proceedings hinges on the idea that the rule is for deterrence of police illegality rather
than a constitutional right of an individual. However, in a case such as the instant one where the
officer involved had absolutely no justification for stopping or searching the individual involved, the
individual' s basic constitutionalrightsdeserve protecting under an exception to the Scott and Jarman
rules.
The issue of the exclusionary rule's application has been analyzed in great depth, but none
of the analyses have pertained to a case such as the instant one where the officer involved had no
cause whatsoever to stop and search an individual's vehicle. The officer clearly testified he was not
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conducting the search under suspicion of illegality or probationary status, and any safety issues were
dispelled by thefirstsearch and the release of Rentzfromtheir detention. Officer Teschini acted in
bad faith in stopping and searching Rentz vehicle once he had been allowed to leave the premises.
Teschini stopped someone who, according to his knowledge, had the same status as the average
citizen driving down the street in their vehicle.
An exclusionary rule should be invoked to deter recurrence of the bad faith exhibited by the
officers in this matter. See, U.S. v. Farmer. 512 F.2d 160,162 (6th Cir. (Ky.) 1975); U.S. v. Brown.
488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. (Fla.) 1973). This gross misconduct by the officers should not be permitted to
be the basis of a state-imposed sanction in Rentz's probation revocation hearing. See, People v.
Wilkerson. 541 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1975). Allowing an exception where the officer's bad faith conduct
was the only purpose behind the stop and search of Rentz's vehicle would substantially further the
rule's deterrent purposes by disallowing officers to benefit from acting in bad faith when they are
not conducting a search based upon either suspicion of illegality, probationary status or safety of
those involved. The need for deterrence in matters such as the instant one outweighs the injury the
probation system would suffer since this narrowly defined exception would specifically require a
showing that the officer was not undertaking a search based on suspicion of illegality, probation
status or safety for those involved.
An exception is necessary as it pertains to factual scenarios as found in the instant matter in
order to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of everyday citizensfrombeing stopped and searched
upon no suspicion of illegality, probationary status or safety risk to others. Officers should not be
allowed to undertake the actions that violated Rentz's Fourth Amendment rights in this matter and
such conduct should not be tolerated as the basis for any type of state-imposed sanction.
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this
Court allow the evidence in the above-referenced matter to be suppressed.
DATED this 7th day of December, 2005.
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San Juan County
FILED

JUL 1 9 2005
CLERK OF THE COURT
DEPUTY

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

PROBATION REVOCATION
AND COMMITMENT TO
UTAH STATE PRISON

vs.
VERNON RENTZ
DOB: 10/21/1981,

Case No. 0317-5

Defendant.
JULY 18,2005
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON
Plaintiff Attorney: Craig C. Halls
Defendant Attorney: William L. Schultz
Defendant appearing on July 18, 2005, before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, District
Court Judge, pursuant to an Order to Show Cause why the defendant should not be held in
violation of the probation agreement in this matter and the defendant having been found in
violation of the terms of the probation agreement and no legal reason having been shown why
defendant's probation should not be revoked and the judgment previously pronounced be upheld
IT IS ORDERED that probation is hereby revoked and the previous judgment of this
Court is imposed, to wit:
That the defendant be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for a term of ONE (1) TO
FIFTEEN (15) YEARS on Count 1: ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a Second
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Degree Felony, and NOT MORE THAN FCVK (5) YEARS on Count 2: AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, to be served concurrently.
Defendant is herebyremandedto the custody of the Sao Juan County Sheriff or other
proper officer to be transportedtothe Utah State Prison.
DATED Otis

day of July. 2005,

KiWisjAtt
Court Judge
San Juan <

fy Attorney

CERYEF1CATE OF MAIUNG^RIAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on txJD_

day of July, 2005,1 mailed, postage prepaid, or

hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF
COMMrTMENTtoWilliam L. Schuttz, Attorneyforthe defendant; Adult Probation and Parole
at 1165 S. Highway 191, S«>te3, Agoab,UTM532;andtoaKDcpartme^

PO

Box 250, Dripcr, UT 84020.
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